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From dynamic equilibrium to imbalance
Abstract: In analysing the mode in which Poland settled its relations with Russia, the conclusion comes
to mind that Poland remains under the spell of the syndromes which were either disposed of, or dealt
with by other European nations. The challenge to solidify Poland’s position within the safety zone that is
vouched by theWest, while establishing pragmatic, rational and conflict free relationships with the East
– Russia, Ukraine, Belarus and the Baltic countries, and particularly Latvia, remains. Thus, the ability to
comprehend Polish national interests, or raison d’état, is required, taking into account realistic and ratio-
nal arguments and the limits of the existing geopolitical situation where competition plays a substantial
part. Poland should also take a long-term view securing its competitive advantages, entering into alli-
ances and making compromises.
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The reversal of vectors
T
he Great Change’ of 1989 laid the ground for the transformation of Polish for-
eign policy. The circumstances were conducive. First and foremost, there was
the change in the political attitude of the Soviet Union, due to the Soviets coming
to terms with the impossibility of sustaining the limited sovereignty of the empire’s
satellite countries. Concurrently, support for the aspiration to gain independence
came flowing in from across the ocean and Western Europe.
The key actors on the Polish political stage were increasingly in agreement with re-
gard to the critical components of Polish foreign policy. They accepted the main direc-
tions that were laid out on 12 September, 1989 by the Prime Minister, who expressed
Poland’s ambitions to “liberate itself” from the restrictions that were imposed by the ex-
isting divisions in Europe and in the world, as well as concerns that this would not com-
plicate Poland’s situation. He announced that Poland would participate in co-forming
a ‘new Europe’ and would work together with its international partners toward overcom-
ing the divisions that existed in the world. He acknowledged that “international relations
that are based on sovereignty and partnership are much more stable than those based on
domination and power.” He declared that the “key goals” of Poland’s foreign policy will
be to “preserve its contents and meaning regardless of which political orientation will be
at the steering wheel at a given time.” He called for a sensible approach in regard to rela-
tions with the Soviet Union, arguing that only a “rational comprehension” of these rela-
tions would lead to “solutions that would take into consideration the interests of the
Soviet Union as a ‘world power’ on the one hand, and the sovereignty of our country and
our right to freely and independently form and govern our internal affairs” (Oœwiadczenie
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premiera, 1989). Generally, the government carried out a policy of “liberating Poland”
from the restrictions imposed by the existing divisions in Europe and the world, coupled
with the reversal of political vectors.
After September 1989, Poland started to participate in the debates of the Council of
Europe. The Chancellor of Germany, Helmut Kohl, paid an official visit to Poland on
9–14 November, 1989. However, the visit was interrupted by the events that erupted in
the GDR and which later led to the unification of Germany. Nevertheless, a visit paid by
such a prominent politician in such a sensitive time and place for Central and Eastern Eu-
rope was significant, and constituted a mark of approval and support for the changes that
were taking place in Poland, it also augured well for the future.
As the leader of changes in the region that brought about the dismantling of commu-
nism, Poland gained the approval of the leading world power – the United States. Lech
Wa³êsa spoke at a joint session of the US Congress on 15 November, 1989. His appear-
ance was applauded by the members of both houses in acknowledgment of ‘victory over
the Evil Empire’.Wa³êsa’s speech was characterised by dignity and a sense of mission. In
exposing the role of Poland in “reaching for the freedom to which she was fully entitled”
he also extended the expectations that “now the participation by theWest in this transfor-
mation shall also increase. We have heard many wonderful words of encouragement.
This is good, but as a worker and a man of real labour I will say that while there is a great
supply of good words in the world, the demand for them does not get any smaller”
(Wa³êsa, 1989).
The intensification of ties with the West was of growing importance within the con-
text of Poland’s future relations with the Soviet Union. During his visit to Moscow on
23–24 November, 1989, Tadeusz Mazowiecki once again spoke of the authentic broad
social base of interactions and their longevity as the basis for relations between the Soviet
Union and Poland. The forthcoming change was signalled by the announcement of the
“cleansing of the field for cooperation by re-evaluating the past: the clearing up of the dif-
ficult matters, and firstly the matter of Katyñ will help both countries liberate themselves
from the layers of negative past experiences and strengthen the friendship between the
two nations” (Nowa sytuacja, 1989).
Abandoning the East...
To what degree was the concept of dynamic equilibrium, developed in 1989, later en-
riched and continued? What of the experiences or achievements of that period were pre-
served or became a permanent feature of political life, what part of that was discarded,
abandoned or labelled as ‘unwanted’ ballast? Looking at it from the ‘trend’ point of view,
the answer appears to be quite clear. It reached the point of calling the idea of ‘equilib-
rium’ into question. The quest to form a context for relations with the East weakened. The
political groups that claimed to be the first generation descendants of “Solidarity” rose to
the top and exerted the greatest influence over domestic and foreign policies. The paucity
of their actual political achievements during the 1990s resulted in overcompensation, par-
ticularly in magnifying the ‘communist syndrome’ which tied them to Russia. The key
attributes of the dominant political formation were to use the self-interpreted past as ama-
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trix for defining the present and the future. There was no attempt among these groups to
even conceal their attempt to preserve the bipolar system within the framework of which
antagonism between communism – which was interpreted intellectually, in a rather unre-
fined manner (Janowski, 1996, p. 213–214) – and the powers of progress, democracy and
reforms became the key tool for sorting out the political vision. Paradoxically, the camp
that deserved the most regard for the fight against the communist regime adopted, from
that very model of political establishment, elements that were in direct contradiction to
the ethos of the August 1980 protests.
Poland was liberating itself from the dependency of the Soviet Empire in a relatively
low conflict manner, as demonstrated by the peaceful withdrawal of Russian troops and
the almost friendly relations between the presidents of Poland and Russia – Wa³êsa and
Yeltsin. Mutual relations were composed of a level of sympathy exerted by Russians to-
wards Poles, knowledge of the East, its material and cultural needs and Polish-Russian
beneficial economic and trade relations. Indeed, Poland did have a chance to play a role as
a bridge between the West and the East.
Nevertheless, the subsequent “Solidarity” governments contrarily strove to turn Po-
land into a bulwark for the West that would safeguard the civilised West against the ‘un-
civilised’ East. Thus, the East was addressed more as the subject of a political and
civilisational crusade and the recipient of western-made cultural goods and values, while
reserving the right to expose the superiority of one’s ownmoral principles, and so on. The
politicians of “Solidarity” demonstrated their mental inability to dispose of the ballast of
the past. As if unable to acknowledge, or come to terms with the downfall of the Soviet
Union, they proceeded to comprehend and treat Russia as the ‘Soviets’. They refused to
acknowledge the changes that were taking place in Russia, or the problems that Russia
had to face. They were also not willing to perceive the interests of Poland and Russia as
symmetrical. Instead, they continued interpreting the aims and aspirations of Russia
through the projection of their own experiences and feelings, especially those of phobias
and frustrations.
So, the Eastern direction became overrun by chaos, impulsiveness, lack of rationality
and the absence of positive and rationally based actions. The events that occurred went
well beyond anything that could be classified as ‘incidents’ in time turning into a peculiar
sequence. The unconcealed antipathy toward Russia was reflected in a foreign policy that
was far from the norms and standards typically observed by the international diplomatic
community. A good example of this was the expulsion of Russian diplomats who were
accused of espionage. This event was commented on in a peculiar manner by the Polish
Minister of Foreign Affairs, who said: “[t]he time has come to put an end to actions born
out of thrillers authored by John Le Carré” (Koniec, 2000). Analysis of the information
regarding the actions by the expelled Russian diplomats raises many doubts as to themea-
sures that were taken, as well as to the level of professionalism of the persons in charge of
state policies (Raport, 2000).
Within the same context, it is hard not to mention the hooligan acts that were carried
out against Russian diplomatic posts. The organisers of these actions frequently had sup-
port and sympathy bestowed on them by people who were descended from the under-
ground “Solidarity” movement and who were now serving in prominent government
posts. The events went uninterrupted by the police or the secret service. The culprits went
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unpunished (Flaga pod but, 2000). The vandal brawls that took place in the front of the
Russian Embassy in Warsaw on 11 November, 2013 should also be noted (Rosja ¿¹da
przeprosin, 2013).
It was very fitting within the context of the ‘government narration’ to take advantage
of the Katyñ tragedy. The Katyñ massacre was a sharp, double edged political sword to
be used in two directions: internally (within Poland) and externally against the East
(Golgota Wschodu, 2000). This approach was seconded by the Catholic Church, which
further elevated the level of drama within the framework of the Polish-Russian relations.
The Church did not conceal its anti-Russian sentiments, and it was the Church’s posture
combined with the failure of the proselytism of John Paul II that become an additional
premise of the ‘Eastern policy’ that was carried out by the descendants of “Solidarity”
thus demonstrating the attachment to the Pope’s tiara.
The triumph of the anti-Russian syndrome...
In essence, the Eastern segment of the foreign policy was given a rather ideologically
emotional dimension which made it impossible to define it in rational terms. The best tes-
timony to the above is the response to a proposal to improve Polish-Russian relations put
forth by the President of Poland, Aleksander Kwaœniewski, during a meeting with mem-
bers of the American Chamber of Commerce on 1 March, 2000. During that meeting the
Polish President defined the relations with Russia as “not good at the moment.” He re-
minded of Russia’s disapproval with regard to Poland joining NATO. Yet at the same
time he underscored the indigenous sources of reservations, pointing out that “undoubt-
edly some significant errors were made by the Polish side [...] and the new government,
despite the declaration that new Polish-Russian relations would be free of the ‘ballast of
the past’, did nothing of consequence towards that end.”
In analysing the entrance onto the political stage by the ‘newcomers’, particularly
with reference to Yeltsin – the Polish President concluded that Polish-Russian talks
would become more difficult because the new Russian President was a strong man with
regard to Europe, but at the same time deeply rooted in the ‘Russian Empire’ way of
thinking (Rakowski, 2000). On 29 March, 2000, during a phone conversation to congrat-
ulate Mr. Putin on his election as President of Russia, the Polish President invited Presi-
dent Putin to visit Poland and expressed his conviction that both countries would
undertake efforts to build the best of bilateral relations based on “joint values, historical
heritage and experiences, and mutual sympathy.” In turn, Putin stated that a neighbour-
hood of such close proximity requires that a suitable rank of mutual relations be estab-
lished while eliminating unwanted incidents and barriers (Kwaœniewski, 2000).
The opinions expressed by the Polish President met with a hostile reaction by the gov-
ernment. The assertions by the Polish President were perceived wrongfully as interfering
with the constitutional powers of the government and the President was accused of under-
mining the Polish raison d’état. During an extraordinary conference that was held on
6March, 2000, the Minister of Foreign Affairs put forth the following questions: “If you,
Mister President, view the Polish foreign policy toward Russia so negatively, then let me
ask do you still agree with the position that Russia does not hold a position of a privileged
122 Karol B. JANOWSKI PP 3 ’14
partner? [...] Are we still in agreement, that Ukraine is the strategic partner for Poland and
[...] that we shall not alter that policy?” (Rozmawiaæ, 2000). This exaggerated reaction not
only attached a false meaning to the intentions of the Polish President, but more impor-
tantly – confirmed the key directions of the Eastern segment of Polish foreign policy.
Could that process have been stopped or reversed by the left-wing of the Polish politi-
cal stage? If it had had global and European political experience and training it could have
seized the moment to redefine Polish foreign policy and to phrase it in a more pragmatic
framework. Mentally, the Left was ready to embrace a more open policy toward the East,
while acknowledging the importance of relations with the West (Oœwiadczenie Leszka
Millera, 2000). However, during the time the Left was in power the foreign policy did not
change. From 1993–1997, the shape of Polish foreign policy was heavily influenced by
Lech Wa³êsa. Despite their own lack of commitment and ideological consistency, the
Left was also a bearer of psychologically political reservations held against them by the
“Solidarity” formation. “[The] SLD’s [Democratic Left Alliance] ability to act is re-
stricted, because after having suffered the period of communism in Poland, which can be
only compared with having suffered ‘scarlet fever’, it must go through a period of quaran-
tine” (Milewicz, 2000) – this was the justification for the political distribution which was
exploited at the time, in spite of the democratic rules andmechanisms. In general, the Left
was paralysed by the fear that any of their actions would be categorised by their political
opponents as closely related to ‘Eastern totalitarianism’ (Nowak-Jeziorañski, 2000).
The prominent leaders of the ruling government from 1997–2001 excelled in hurling
abuse, insinuations and slanderous accusations, which after all, only testify to intellectual
weakness. They exhibited an ‘anticommunism’ that was almost Jacobin-Bolshevik in na-
ture, suggesting that the Left is still subject to the pressures and ideals of their obsolete
doctrine. They perceived the potential victory of the Left in the presidential and parlia-
mentary elections as disastrous and catastrophic. “The dominance of the political stage by
the SLD could undermine and question the current goals of Polish foreign policy”
(Rybicki, 2000). While in power from 2001–2005, the Left failed to reverse the tenden-
cies that dominated foreign policy. Admittedly, they were able to sustain or enhance key
elements. The cooperation with the West had deepened and moved forward, as demon-
strated by the progress in the integration with European military and economic and politi-
cal structures; in 2004, Poland became a member of the EU.
It seems that the majority of the dilemmas that Poland was facing in 1989, are still cur-
rent today. Starting in 2005, when the Right came to power, the Western direction within
the context of foreign policy had gained the upper hand, while efforts to form a rational
policy toward the East had dwindled. The distance toward Russia deepened over time,
taking on a form of hostility while accompanied by a growing subservience toward the
USA. The rulers subscribed to the illusion that they were participating in a ‘great world
political drama’. No consideration was given to the character of the competition between
Russia and the USA. Poland, despite its subordination to US interests was not able to se-
cure, aside from positive gestures and promises, any concrete benefits, what is more, even
those that were eventually gained usually did not match the promises or expectations.
This is easy to comprehend, because the needs and wants of US partners are taken into
consideration only if they fit, or at least do not contradict US interests and policies. How-
ever, the Polish authorities give the impression of being unaware of this fact.
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The next issue that resides outside of the realms of the political imagination of Polish
politicians it the matter of the relations that tie Russia and various member countries of
the EU. These various mutual and particular interests come together in spider’s web-like
pattern. Priority lies with the ability to carry through promises, and not with values, as
these take second place within the EU. Groups of Polish politicians who aspire to be re-
cognised as political elite do not differ in their perception of the political triangle of the
USA-EU-Russia from their counterparts in other member states within the region. In-
stead, striving to serve as a bridge between the EU and Russia they use the EU as a tool to
play out their own psychological problems within their relations with Russia. Today, Po-
land and the Baltic states are the US’s ‘Trojan Horse’ in Europe, and they provide more
benefit to the US administration than to the EU – this commentary on the tri-party rela-
tions between the US-EU and Russia, (Polska to, 2010), is consistent with the conclu-
sions of academic analysis of the subject.
Poland has been successful in regard to its orientation towards the West, particularly
in the economic sphere. However, the effects of the policy toward the East raise many
doubts. Admittedly, more than once, Poland has been able to convince her European part-
ners to act somewhat consistently with Poland’s intentions. This indicates that the social,
economic, political and even axiological potential of Poland is valued. However, when
looking at it from the perspective of social, economic and national interests, Poland’s
achievements within Eastern sectors present an array of real failures. Without going into
detail regarding the nature and sense of the actions undertaken by Russia, whose past as
the ‘Great Empire’ is still well remembered, it should be noted that her actions and behav-
iour drifted away from European standards on many occasions. But Russia’s influence
on the course of international political events cannot be underestimated. Yet subse-
quent political regimes rooted in “Solidarity” have shown a lack of comprehension with
regard to Russia’s rights and interests while accentuating their own. Their political pos-
turing and behaviour resulted in the evolution of a very peculiar Polish-Russian rela-
tionship that was significantly different from those typical of other European nations
which formed their relations with Russia aiming at a settled future and mutual benefits.
One of the clearest examples of a failure brought about by the ‘mission over the econ-
omy’ principle was the matter of the Nord Stream Company. Referring to the ‘anti Rus-
sian syndrome’, as its result Poland was left out of the decision process regarding this
strategic undertaking.
... and its influence on regional strategy
The anti-Russian syndrome has acquired a strategic dimension. The countries that
neighbour Russia are perceived by the Polish government as elements of an offensive
sanitary cordon. Polish-Ukrainian relations are encumbered with tragic consequences
connected to Polish expansion to the East, as well as with the increasing national aspira-
tions of the Ukrainians. The Polish attitude toward Ukraine appears to be irrational. ‘The
Orange Revolution’ along with the ‘Maidan of Freedom’ (2006) was enthusiastically en-
dorsed by Polish politicians and political parties. The dominant attitude was a deeply felt
‘mission’ to carry out the charge of bringing freedom and democracy to Ukraine. This,
124 Karol B. JANOWSKI PP 3 ’14
however, was accompanied by a lack of awareness as to the real state of Ukrainian inter-
nal affairs, particularly in terms of the readiness of the Ukrainian nation to bring in and
adhere to the values and mechanisms of the West, as well as the inability to translate the
ideals of the ‘mission’ into interests that mirror the Polish national interest.
Finally, a conclusion can be drawn as to the lack of professionalism and ability of cri-
sis management. There is a prevailing delusion that the ‘Ukrainian card’ opens the oppor-
tunity to flirt with Russia as equals. In essence, Ukraine has became an instrument of
a local nature, to strike at Russia. This is what the whole thinking behind liberating
Ukraine from under an ‘imperial dictatorship’ and introducing the “buffer” into the
“Western Orbit” can be boiled down to. The Orange Revolution was disappointing in
terms of the recognition of Polish interests and desires. Yet, despite the failures, or maybe
because of them, the anti-Russia phobia deepened, reaching the level of a political para-
noia that skews the “accepted and constructive reactions to threats [...] brings in patholog-
ical elements [...] not only activates, but also deforms defense mechanisms and correct
political responses” (Robins, Post, 1999, p. 31).
The aspiration by Polish politicians to exert an influence over Russia – which means
to obstruct Russia – was exemplified by the Eastern Partnership initiative of 2009. The of-
ficial purpose was to bring about closer cooperation by particular member states of the
EU based on EU standards, values and norms, whereas in reality it was directed against
Russia. The members of the alliance – former republics of the Soviet Union – Armenia,
Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine, were enticed to break off historical
and economic ties with Russia. Poland actively supported the thoughtless anti-Russian
undertakings by the Georgian President (2008), also attempting to entangle other mem-
bers of the EU andNATO into it. The countries of the Eastern Partnership were to be links
in a chain of a ‘buffer cordon’ separating Europe from Russia. Poland propagated this
idea most intensely, making efforts to render this approach from a policy into practice
without giving any regard to the potential consequences and response that could take on
the form of economic harassment (prices of commodities, an embargo on food products,
etc.), assuming international solidarity and support from her allies.
The Polish-Russian context, but primarily the mission to spread freedom and democ-
racy – included Belarus, to counterweigh the Russian influence. To make up for the ab-
sence of success, the conciliatory approach was abandoned and substituted by the
language of aggressive superiority. Poland had been taken hostage by its own mission,
which it was not able to carry out. So, came the escalation of conflict, political quarrels
began and antagonistic actions supported by demagogy and black PR, including med-
dling in the matters of a sovereign Belarusian nation. The Polish authorities support the
young people that are contesting official public order, provide support for the hostile TV
station Bielsat, grant extraordinary privileges to the activists of the Polish People’s Alli-
ance in Belarus and use blackmail. The Prime Minister and the Minister of Foreign Af-
fairs jointly hosted a meeting with the representatives of the Belarusian opposition. The
Prime Minister announced that “[t]here shall be no aid for Belarus without a dialogue
with the opposition” appealing to the countries of the EU against establishing closer rela-
tions with the Belarus regime (Miñsk, 2011). The Polish minority is used as an instru-
ment, by implanting conflicts, disintegration and destabilisation. It is being exploited in
a conflict against the country within whose border it exists. This weakens Poland’s ability
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to homogeneously elaborate its own interests, and makes it impossible to forge a rational
and pragmatic relationship with this neighbouring country.
Admittedly, preceding the Ukrainian revolt in the autumn of 2013, Polish-Russian re-
lations appeared to be improving, due to the pragmatic approach of the ruling party and,
paradoxically, as a result of the Smoleñsk catastrophe (2010). However, gestures were
not followed by actions. To the contrary, the regression continued. As a result of attempts
to influence the course of the Ukrainian drama, Poland took the lead in radicalising atti-
tudes, postures and actions towards Russia by politicians of the EU. “At present, it is im-
possible not to realise that a Pole is becoming a rising political star” – this is how the
Czech weekly Respekt commented on the activities of the Polish Minister of Foreign Af-
fairs in Ukraine and in the EU (Czeski Respekt, 2014).
Poland has written yet another page that confirms its inability to define and carry out
a rational foreign policy, floating instead on clouds of euphoria and emotion, living
through its anti-Russian mission without reflecting upon the potential consequences. It
took the lead in motivating Ukrainians to turn away from Russia. The easily understood
desire to improve one’s existence and climb out of poverty is interpreted as a universal
desire for freedom and democracy, and a readiness to embrace Western standards. The
mirage of ‘wealth for one and for all’ and of Ukraine soon gaining closer relations with
the EU has been floated in front of the Ukrainians for years. The expectation of benefits
took over the imagination of the people of Ukraine, enticing them to engage in demon-
strations, social unrest, drastic and aggressive protests, breaking the law and public order.
Command over these events was assumed by the extremely radical and combative po-
litical powers that were centred around the so-called Right Sector. Military-like squads
were established, subject to military lines of command, and equipped not only with weap-
ons that resembled museum exhibits, but also arms seized in clashes with militia or the
special forces (BERKUT), or taken from police or army magazines. Squad members re-
ceived training modelled after the training of assault groups. The atmosphere along the
‘Maidan of Freedom’ was largely created by the All-Union of Freedom “Svoboda”, one
of the principal and in some towns the leading political force in Western Ukraine. It con-
tributes greatly to the radicalisation of political sentiments and expressions. Originally, it
bore the name the Social-National Party and its emblems resembled those of Hitler’s
NSDAP. It relates itself to the nationalism of the Second World War (Dzia³acze Swo-
body, 2014). Its effectiveness rests on the importance of organisational structure, mobil-
ity and the ability to echo and propagate the desires and expectations of a large portion of
the Ukrainian people. Admittedly, it has only 37 members in the 450 member parliament
that was elected on 28 October, 2012, while the Party of the Regions (the party of the
ousted president, Victor Yanukovych) holds 185 mandates, Julia Tymoshenko’s Batkyv-
china (the Homeland) holds 101 mandates, 40 mandates belong to Vitali Klitschko’s
UDAR, 32 are held by the communists, 43 by independent parliamentarians and the rest
are spread among smaller parties (Ukraina, 2012).
However, in reality it is ‘the street’ and the crowds of the mavericks on the ‘Maidan of
Freedom’ that dictate the survival of the fittest and how office is exercised. Nationalism
(and also anti-Semitism) with Bandera traditions prevails, often taking on the form of
fighting squads. Foreign Policy – an American magazine, states: “Putin’s invasion of the
Crimea must be evaluated in the strongest of language.” Still, a solid policy should be es-
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tablished on an honest analysis of all political actors. Such an analysis would require that
the arguments presented by Crimea that “the new leaders of Kiev are mostly fascists” are
true and should be acknowledged (Foreign, 2014). The euphorically experienced climate
of the combat clashes, and the group exaltation of the victory over the recently elected and
generally accepted powers, weakens rationalism and makes it impossible for those politi-
cians who declare themselves on the side of civilised methods of political disagreement
and political competition to influence the political process (Co siê wydarzy³o w Kijowie,
2014).
Well written into the stream of confrontational, populist rhetoric that is belligerent in
a form, but most of all anti-Russian in content is Julia Tymoschenko (the presidential pre-
tender) – the leading figure of the Orange Revolution. In a telephone conversation
(18 March, 2014) she referred to the Russians as “damn kacapy who should be executed
by firing squad along with their leader” and she said that the 8 million Russians who live
on the territory of Ukraine should be destroyed with the use of the nuclear weapons. The
German government distanced itself from this kind of political expression. A spokesman
for the government defined the phrases that were employed by the former prime minister
as “fantasies of violence,” stating further that “[d]espite the wholehearted opposition to
the activities undertaken by Russia in the Crimea, and regardless of all – even fundamen-
tal – differences of opinions, there are barriers of ideas andmanifestations that shall never
be thwarted” (Fantazje o przemocy, 2014).
A more complex assessment of the developments in Ukraine was formed by Günter
Verheugen, the former European Commissioner for Enlargement, incidentally much
praised by the Polish media and politicians at that point in time. He pointed out that the
source of escalation of the Ukrainian conflict is rooted in Kiev, “where we have the first
government in the 21st Century some members of which are fascists.” He categorised the
provision of financial assistance to Ukraine as a mistake. In his opinion “it is still not too
late to resolve the conflict and we shall prevent an escalation that would lead to the new
cold war.” Europe should provide Russia an all-European safety structure, in which Rus-
sia would participate together with NATO. He concluded with the assertion that “[e]ven
more significant is the foundation of a special economic cooperation zone from Lisbon to
Vladivostok” (Verheugen, 2014).
Is there a chance of success for the Polish crusade?
The decision makers of Polish foreign policy do take stock of the diversity of political
options, political orientations, the dynamics and the long-term consequences of the
Ukrainian events. However, they do not conduct a profit and loss analysis in terms of Pol-
ish interests. They have expressed, and continue to do so, indiscriminate and uncondi-
tional support for the Maidan revolt in its effects so far, mostly for its anti-Russian aims.
On 3 December, 2013, the Polish parliament passed a special resolution on the situation
in Ukraine, announcing its solidarity with the Ukrainian people, who “are demonstrating
today with great determination that they desire their nation to become a fully-fledged
member of the European Union.” The Polish parliament called on the parliaments of
other EU member nations to undertake initiatives aiming at strengthening civil society
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(Uchwa³a Sejmu RP w sprawie sytuacji na Ukrainie, 2013). On 24 January, 2014, the
Polish parliament condemned the use of force to “repress freedom and the rights of
the citizens, particularly the right to peaceful demonstrations and freedom of speech”
(Uchwa³a Sejmu RP w sprawie wydarzeñ na Ukrainie, 2014).
On 5March, 2014, Ukraine was the lone point on the agenda of the session of the Pol-
ish parliament. It was with clear satisfaction that Donald Tusk announced that Poland had
accepted the leading role. He said that these efforts must result in Ukraine signing the EU
Association Agreement. From that perspective, too, the PrimeMinister presented the po-
sition and role to be played by Poland: “[t]oday, we are not the object of the game [...] but
the subject of it.” He proceeded to make a virtue of the strategy that was implemented by
Poland. He encouraged EU allies to follow the Polish example and adopt similar goals
and motivation. To emphasise the drama of the moment he recalled the “Munich procras-
tination.” “Anyone who thinks that peace and stability can be ensured by giving in to
threats and demands is in error [...] Poland has never experienced such a critical situation
close to our borders.” In his speech, he suggested a specific sequence of events that led
from the awakening of Ukrainian hopes, to the confrontations that were “dangerous for
Poland,” to which the only response must be unity of the entire West.
According to Tusk, the entire future of the Polish nation, its very existence and sover-
eignty is being put into question, and all of that because of the actions undertaken by Rus-
sia. It is Russia who bears sole responsibility for the crisis, having shown at more than one
juncture that she had not dispensed with her imperial ambitions. In the face of such dan-
gers and threats to be faced by Poland, it is paramount to strengthen the battle spirit: “[t]he
Polish soldier [...] his morale, his bravery, his training and his patriotism are flawless, he
is still better than themost modern equipment” – announced the PrimeMinister of the Re-
public of Poland, and he was then applauded by the members of parliament (with
a long-lasting, standing ovation) as they accepted a resolution on solidarity with Ukraine
(Sprawozdanie stenograficzne, 2014).
The Ukrainian events exposed the strength of the anti-Russian syndrome. It became
an element of the election campaign which was launched by the National Convention of
Civic Platform (PO) on 22 March, 2014 for seats in the European Parliament. The key
points on the agenda were Ukraine and the menace of Russian aggression. Symbolising
the support for Ukraine, was the participation byVitali Klitschko. Donald Tusk dealt with
the Ukrainian crisis as a dare laid before “the whole of Europe.” “The results of the elec-
tions to the EU Parliament will establish whether the European Union will live on [...]
These elections just may be about the question of whether Polish children will be going to
school this 1st of September” – he stated, referring to the drama of September 1939
(Opozycja kpi z Tuska, 2014). The Prime Minister maintained that Poland is a “valued
partner” that engages in a “rational and responsible policy” (Tusk na RW PO, 2014). The
statement regarding a competent and responsible policy stands in direct contradiction to
the aggression, and the establishing of a pro-Ukrainian, and in reality, anti-Russian cru-
sade, which is way above Poland’s ability to continue; there is a lack of qualities of the
biblical David to defeat the Goliath. The way the Ukrainian conflict is being used to sup-
ply Poland with an adequate proportion of political drama brings back memories of the
pre-World War II slogan propagated by the Sanation party, “United, strong, and ready.”
Predominantly, it is the speech given on 5 May, 1939, by the Polish Foreign Minister,
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Józef Beck, who stated in reaction to Hitler’s ultimatum: “Here in Poland we do not know
the phrase of peace at any cost. There is only one thing in the lives of people, nations and
states that is priceless and that is honour” (Przemówienie, 5.05.1939).
The increasingly warlike rhetoric of recent months has at the same time become a tool
for political combat. Foreign policy has been used for the purpose of the political compe-
titions driven by the political parties descended from “Solidarity”. The goal is to evoke
feelings of fear and tension in their supporters. Civic Platform, having been in power for
two terms without much to show for in terms of economic and social contributions, as
well as not being able to present new ideas for the EU or a clear role for Poland within EU
structures, is using Ukraine, and predominantly Russia, as a reason to keep them in
power. In looking at the way Civic Platform is using political marketing tools, an analogy
can be drawn to the situation in Great Britain, where falling levels of support for the Con-
servative Party were changed only after the war in the Falklands started. The result of the
war secured Margaret Thatcher another term in office.
Fear for the destiny of Ukraine was expressed by the President of Poland, for whom it
was the key to relations with Russia. He shared views that the situation presented a genu-
ine threat for Poland, and about themeans of counteracting the danger, stating “I dream of
a stronger NATO presence in Poland, because this is a matter of Poland’s safety.” How-
ever, he stipulated that “nobody is after an all-out conflict with Russia” and declared that
good economic relations with Russia would be sustained and the conflict would not im-
pact the sphere of cultural relations (Komorowski, 2014). Such a declaration, which held
out the expectations that Russia will come to terms with Poland’s hostile gestures, only
testifies to the hypocrisy andmisperception of the state of affairs by the Polish authorities.
“Why should the ordinary citizen of Poland and Russia pay for the ill-conceived policy
toward Ukraine and the decisions made by Putin?” – this question was posed by the Pol-
ish Prime Minister during his visit on 6 April to the region that borders with the
Kaliningrad oblast (Kampania, 2014). By the same token the question ought to be asked,
“why should the average Polish citizen suffer the consequences of the imprudent
‘Sarmatist’ undertaking of their rulers?”
How should the undertakings of the authorities be interpreted? What is, and what is
not of substance within the implemented strategy? By taking on the role of supporter of
Ukraine, the ruling party is taking on a highly insecure and risky undertaking. Ukraine
is not capable of controlling its internal revolt, which is an attempt at resolving many
different issues. Due to the economic instability, the unchanged structure of the ruling
powers that are dominated by the ‘oligarchs’, and the nationalism and hostility toward
Poland, and finally due to the increased inflow to Poland of desperate Ukrainians, the
outcomes may be of a very unexpected nature. Simply put, Poland is unable to meet the
expectations of the Ukrainians. From that point of view, the problem that Poland is fac-
ing is not Russia, it is Ukraine. In showing their support for the Ukrainian Revolution,
which is an emanation of mutiny against Russia, a mutiny which is not civic or demo-
cratic in nature and which may bring totally unforeseen consequences, Polish politi-
cians use highly elevated slogans. Furthermore, they elevate a local conflict, however
justified, into a global matter. Presenting a radical point of view, they are trying to con-
vince the nations of the EU to forgo the care, restraint and moderation that are rooted in
the care for the mutual interests of the EU. Polish leaders are enticing them to step onto
PP 3 ’14 The dilemmas of the Eastern Policy of the Republic of Poland... 129
a risky path, justifying this by waving high ideals and assuming the character of the
‘EU’s conscience’.
It is worth recalling the results of the research byGallup, which shows that the country
that poses the greatest risk to world peace is the USA (24% of respondents). Russia, with
2%, is outside the top ten. However, 17.9% of Poles believe that it is Russia that poses the
greatest threat to world peace, assigning the US sixth place (5.8%) after China and ahead
of Syria (Gallup, 2013). A visible correlation with the last month’s events is shown by the
polls conducted by the Public Opinion Research Centre (CBOS) that show that 80%
of respondents fear Russia the most, listed next are Ukraine and Germany (CBOS,
3–9.04.2014). 39% of respondents expressed their dislike of Russians (versus 31% sym-
pathy), while 41% did not like Romanians and 52% did not like Roma people (Stosunek
Polaków, CBOS, February 2013). 47% of Poles expressed reservations with regard to
sovereignty (as compared to 20% in December) and almost half (45%) see threats to the
economy and tie them to Poland’s economic dependency. At the same time, the percent-
age of Poles expressing the opinion that Poland faces a threat to its sovereignty has de-
creased from 37% in December to 18% at the moment. Poles strongly support Poland’s
membership of NATO. Currently, 81% (a 19% increase from February) support member-
ship, versus 5% who oppose it. 64% desire to have an increased military presence of
NATO in Poland, and 21% support the permanent presence of a NATO contingent in Po-
land (CBOS, 3–9.04.2014).
It would be wise to be cautious in regard to the results of public opinion polls, but by
the same token, these should not be disregarded, taking into consideration the fact that
both sides – the politicians and the society – influence one another. The Gallup research
surely reflects the consciousness of respondents who notice the hypocrisy of the USA.
The US shows no reservations in regard to applying manipulation or deceit in order to
push through its agenda (Iraq). Whereas, when considering the state of the awareness of
Poles, particularly as shown by the CBOS research, consideration should be given, when
looking at the dynamics, to the general lack of knowledge in regard to political phenom-
ena and processes, the instability of social attitudes, as well as to the influence of political
correctness (the spiral of silence). A sizeable chunk of the Polish nation turns out to be
very receptive to marketing, particularly when it comes to raising emotions. Secondly,
consideration should be paid to the strength of the efforts at socialisation that are being
taken on by the leading political groups, and their political domination within the open
political market where the postures of the electorate are fluid and characterized by
a highly adaptable subservience.
In general, it may be said that this way of conducting political policy is not targeted at
achieving the substantial interests of Poland. It rather constitutes a reflection of an unre-
fined strategy, rooted in the notions of carrying out a civilising mission, martyrology,
phobias, frustrations, exaggeration and quarrelsomeness. The inability to dispose of the
ballast of the past makes it difficult to apply professionalism to the policies directed at the
East. It also reveals the conceptual poverty of the politicians as well as the intellectual
weakness of their power base, and finally, the lack of willingness and ability to step out-
side their own intellectual horizons and political experience. The lack of consideration
given to the ingenious conclusions drawn, among others, by Stanis³aw Bieleñ (Bieleñ,
2014) or Ryszad Ziêba (Ziêba, 2014) bears further consideration. Nonetheless, the deci-
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sion makers remain convinced that Poland is the leader of an East-bound mission to bring
European civilisation to those countries. As a result, instead of becoming a bridge be-
tween the West and the East, Poland had become the civilisational rampart, posing as the
key propagator of the ideological values of the West. Polish foreign policy toward the
East is not an applied art, but rather the magnitude of “empty grandiose words, senti-
ments, the romantic spirit and an absolute absence of a rational and positivistic thinking”
(Lazari, 2009, p. 193).
Considering these assumptions it seems appropriate to formulate the thesis that it is
not Russia that presents a problem for Poland, at least, not in the sense in which it is being
seen by the Polish leadership. Neither territorial sovereignty nor borders, nor its inde-
pendence is being jeopardized. The analysis of the neighbourhood bordering Kaliningrad
contradicts the Cassandra-like prophecies. Russia remains pragmatic in its own percep-
tions, which means it is fending for its identity, its position in Europe and in the world,
while distancing itself from globalisation, which constitutes a tool of large corporations,
particularly in the US. According to the 2001 Nobel Laureate, Joseph E. Stiglitz, “[i]n the
‘new’, post-communist Russian revolution [...] the front guard is kept by the international
bureaucrats who coerce the unwilling people into unwanted changes by using Bol-
shevik-like methods.” Stiglitz emphasises the role of those US and IMF consultants who
supported those who led Russia andmany other economies onto the “chosen path, putting
forward arguments supporting the new religion – market fundamentalism” (Stiglitz,
2007, p. 151 and 127).
Russia does not accept the Pax Americana, however the possibilities of questioning it
are limited. The US attempts, with different results, to influence the areas surrounding
Russia. Since the fall of the Soviet Union, Russia has been unable to maintain control
over the countries that departed from the Soviet Bloc. All the same, it tries to hold them
within the sphere of own influence, or to influence their conduct using various instru-
ments of pressure, i.e. the ethnic argument – the protection of Russians who are the inhab-
itants of a given country or region. Nevertheless, it would be hard to support the thesis
that Poland’s sovereignty is threatened by Russia. Such arguments only serve to preserve
the hostile relations with Russia, whereas it should be considered that it is not Russia who
needs Poland, but it is Poland for whom Russia is the more attractive partner. By casting
aside its civilising mission and attitudes of a political crusade, Poland could gain a chance
to create new relations with Russia. Without jeopardising its dignity or independence
– even as a member of the EU – Poland faces the challenge of establishing its relations
with Russia on the basis of mutual benefits. Holding up the attitude and the icon of the
most unfriendly and aggressive toward Russia country amongst the nations of the EU
constitutes a path that leads nowhere, only to further losses that will be borne by Poland.
In the foreseeable future, regardless of the current conflict, Russia will not cease to be an
important partner for Europe and for the US. The condition for the rebirth of positive rela-
tions between Poland and Russia is to dispose of the attitude of supremacy of one’s own
arguments and convictions, and to treat the domain of international relations as an area of
conflicting interests forcing of which is not only the right, but also the responsibility of
each partner.
It is therefore clear that, when examining the manner in which Poland establishes rela-
tions with its neighbours within the region, it can be argued that themost important matter
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for Poland is to root itself strongly within the safe zone that is guaranteed by integration
into the West, while establishing rational, practical and not quarrelsome relationships
with the East – Russia, Ukraine, Belarus and the Baltic countries, particularly Latvia.
This would demonstrate the power of the Poland, as a country, to realistically and ratio-
nally grasp its national interests, the Polish raison d’état, within the given geopolitical
conditions of competing interests, gaining supremacy or entering into alliances or com-
promises and choosing long-term options.
Warsaw, April 2014.
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Dylematy polityki wschodnie RP. Od równowagi dynamicznej do nierównowagi
Streszczenie
O ile poddaæ analizie sposób uk³adania przez Polskê stosunków z s¹siadami w regionie, nasuwa siê
wniosek, i¿ pozostaje on pod presj¹ syndromów, z którymi zdo³a³y sobie poradziæ – b¹dŸ odrzuciæ – kra-
je Europy. Nadal tedy pozostaje znalezienie siê (ugruntowanie) w strefie bezpieczeñstwa gwarantowa-
nego integracj¹ z Zachodem, ale równoczeœnie racjonalne i pragmatyczne u³o¿enie poprawnych
(niekonfliktowych) stosunków zeWschodem – Rosj¹, Ukrain¹, Bia³orusi¹, krajami nadba³tyckimi, oso-
bliwie Litw¹. Oznacza to zdolnoœæ do racjonalnego i realnego pojmowania interesów narodowych, tj.
racji stanu w konkretnych warunkach geopolitycznych – konkurencji, uzyskiwania przewagi b¹dŸ za-
wierania sojuszy czy kompromisów, dokonywania d³ugofalowych wyborów.
S³owa kluczowe: interes, polityka zagraniczna, racja stanu, Rosja, syndrom
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